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Abstract 
 
In this paper we show that work on international market regulation has paid
insufficient attention to the critical role played by domestic political and
regulatory institutions.  Existing literature emphasizes the role of market
power,  determined  by  market  size,  in  analyzing  international regulatory
influence.  While we do not contes t the importance of market power, we
introduce  the  notion of   domestic  regulatory  capacity  to c apture  the
domestic institutional side of international market regulation that previous
work has sidestepped.   Domestic regulatory capacity is the missing link
between  latent  market  power  vested  in  market  size  and i nternational
influence activated through regulatory institutions.  The article employs the
market  size  argument  as a nul l  hypothesis  and contrasts it with  a
specification of market power that includes domestic regulatory capacity
alongside market size.  The two perspec tives are evaluated in a structured,
focused  case compar ison  of i nternational  regulatory  dynamics  in the
financial securities and personal data fields.   
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Two  decades  of  domestic  and  international  economic  liberalization  have  transformed  the 
character of state/market relationships, placing regulation at the center of international economic 
governance.  Whereas factor endowments and trade rules used to be decisive, market regulation 
increasingly shapes the terms of competition, corporate fortunes, and national economic welfare.  
Who successfully exports domestic regulation and who sets international market rules is thus not 
only an important question for academics, but is also a critical concern for business leaders, 
consumer advocates, and policymakers.   
 
It  is  no  secret  that  the  United  States  long  enjoyed  a dec isive  edge  in  international  market 
regulation.  Yet the situation appears to be changing: “Increasingly, Rules of Global Economy are 
set in Brussels,” titled the Wall Street Journal.
1  Over the last few years, Europe and particularly 
the European Union has become an influential force, shaping international market rules in areas 
as diverse as food safety, wireless communications, environmental protection and data privacy.
2  
The  apparently  shifting  pattern  of influence ,  away  from  U.S.  dominance  and  toward a more 
complicated situation where Europe and the U.S. score in different areas, is an obvious empirical 
puzzle.  At the same time, it highlights a theoretical puzzle about the variables and mechanisms 
that  determine international regulatory influence, that is the ability of a j urisdiction to move 
international market regulation closer to its ideal point.  
 
Most existing work on this topic views market power as the principal determinant of international 
regulatory influence and equates market power with market size.  This art icle finds support for 
the first premise and contests the second.  The intuitive argument that underpins existing work is 
that the larger a domestic market relative to the global market, the greater the abil ity to shape 
international rules through regulatory export or negotiation.  It is their economic might, in other 
words, that provides the U.S. and Europe with the power to shape international market regulation.  
Yet we contend that market size alone does not equal market power.  The latent power vested in a 
sizeable market has to be activated and projected to shape international market rules.  The ability 
to activate and project, in turn, depends on a jurisdiction’s regulatory capacity, a variable that 
captures the domestic political and regulatory institutions in which markets are embedded.
3  We 
define regulatory capacity as a jurisdiction’s ability to formulate, monitor, and enforce a set of 
domestic market rules.  
 
                                                 
1 See Brandon Mitchener, “Increasingly, Rules of Global Economy are set in Brussels,”  The Wall Street Journal, 23 
April 2002, A1 
2 For food safety see Young 2003, telecommunications policy see Glimstedt 2001, for environmental policy see 
Bretherton (1999), and for data privacy see Shaffer (2000).  
3 In formulating a generalizable theory, we refer to “domestic” institutions even though the European Union is more 
appropriately viewed as a case of multilevel governance spanning domestic and supranational spheres.  See Hooghe 
and Marks 2000.  In this system, power centers vary by issue area.  Consciousness of such variation allows us to 
apply domestic institutional analysis to the EU as a whole and thus do justice to the importance of EU-level 
policymaking in certain industries. IE Working Paper                                       DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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This article’s principal contribution is thus a correction of existing literature.  It does not refute 
the importance of market size but shows that market size alone is insufficient.  Given a large 
market, the probability that a jurisdiction will be able to exert regulatory influence increases with 
the extent of its regulatory capacity.  As a  deliberate corrective, this article shares the existing 
literature’s  analytic  focus o n  the  ability  to  shape  international  market  rules  rather  than 
concentrating  on  case-to-case  motivation  for  doing  so.  It i s  clear  that  policymakers  face 
considerably incentives to export domestic regulation.  These range from deliberate efforts to 
defend the domestic regulatory status quo against international arbitrage all the way to political 
pressure from domestic producers for an international level-playing field (Singer, 2004; Bach, 
2004).  While we show in the article’s empirical section why regulators sought to export specific 
domestic regulation, our framework does not contain a universal theory of preferences in the 
context of international market regulation.  Rather, in line with existing work on market power, 
we examine the factors determining states’ ability to influence international market regulation 
when they choose to do so.  This also me ans that we do not consider international regulatory 
harmonization  that  results  from  pure  market  coordination,  instances  where  neither  deliberate 
promotion of rules nor interest conflicts occur.
4  
 
The focus on regulatory capacity and the domestic institutions that activate market power rests on 
historical institutionalist theory (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992; Thelen, 1999).  Most 
importantly, we build on work in comparative political economy that examines the political and 
economic implications of sector-specific regulatory structures against the background of broader, 
polity-level  variation  in  regulatory  styles  and  policymaking  capabilities.   Such re gulatory 
institutions constrain and enable the ability of actors to achieve their desired outcome.  In the case 
of international market regulation, they determine the ability of large markets to translate their 
economic clout into political power.  In addition to shedding light on critical determinants of 
influence patterns in international market regulation, a principal goal of this study is therefore to 
intensify  the  dialog  between t wo  closely  related  fields  –  comparative  political  economy  and 
international political economy. 
 
The paper begins with an analysis of existing International Relations literature that stresses the 
role of market size as a determinant of international regulatory influence.  Section two  defines 
regulatory capacity, shows how it serves to activate market power, and introduces qualitative 
measures for its assessment in a given industry, jurisdiction, and time.  We then evaluate existing 
arguments  privileging  market  size a gainst  the  historical  institutionalist  perspective  with  its 
attention to regulatory capacity in the context of two historical narratives – securities market 
regulation and the regulation of personal data flows over the last three decades.  Owing to the 
digitalization  of personal da ta  and  the  dematerialization  of  securities,  business  in  both  areas 
increasingly  takes  place  through  sophisticated  communications  networks  that  span  the glo be.  
Jurisdictional conflict and regulatory spillover is therefore the norm rather than the exception in 
these  areas,  making  them  an  ideal  set  of  cases  to  evaluate  contrasting  theoretical  claims.  
                                                 
4 This boundary condition parallels Keohane’s focus on cooperation arising from patterns of discord, rather than 
from harmony where cooperation is analytically unproblematic. IE Working Paper                                      DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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Additionally, the policy areas offer ample variation in patterns of influence across jurisdictions 
and time.  Whereas the U.S. long dominated international securities regulation, Europe has in 
recent years made considerable inroads.  In the case of personal data, the U.S. and the EU have 
pursued  opposite  regulatory  strategies  but  the  Europeans have  been  far  more  successful  at 
exporting  their  model  to  third  countries.   These   historical  narratives,  therefore,  are  uniquely 
suited  to  intensify  the di alog  of  theory  and  evidence  that  is crit ical  to she d  light  on the 
plausibility, strengths, and weaknesses of the proposed theoretical framework.  Subsequently, we 
review the market size and regulatory capacity perspectives in light of the evidence.  We find that 
regulatory capacity is indeed a critical factor in the activation of market power.  As expected, we 
do not find that market size is irrelevant.  But market size alone neither offers a complete nor a 
compelling explanation of the cases.  Coupling market size with regulatory capacity, by contrast, 
yields  a  more  nuanced  view  of m arket  power and   handles  the  complexity  of  the  empirical 
realities.  The final section draws conclusions for research, business, and public policy. 
 
 
MARKET SIZE: EXISTING ARGUMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS    
 
Arguing that military power is only one way through which hegemons advance their interests, 
James and Lake (1989) call market power “the se cond face of hegemony.”  Hegemons rely on 
their large markets to change relative prices and thus tilt the international economy in their favor.  
Working  in  this  tradition,  Drezner  applies  the  argument  to  the  case  of  international  market 
regulation.  Emphasizing the decisive role played by great powers in international regulatory 
dynamics, Drezner defines them as “governments that posses large internal markets” (Drezner, 
2004:3).  Large markets, he argues, have a “gravitational effect on producers – the larger the 
economy,  the  stronger  the  pull  for  producers  to  secure  and  exploit  market  access  (Drezner, 
2004:5).”  Given the international distribution of economic power, Drezner views only the U.S. 
and  the  EU  as  currently  possessing  sufficiently  large  domestic  markets  to  project  influence.  
When the two heavyweights’ interests converge, regulatory harmonization is possible.  When 
they are at odds, competition between two rival camps splits global markets. 
 
A  second  group  of sc holars  view  international  market  share  in a n  industry  as  the  decisive 
determinant of international regulatory influence, rather than the overall size of the domestic 
economy.  Aggarwal (1985), for example, attributes U.S. power in international textile bargaining 
to  the  size  of  the  U.S.  textile  industry  and  domestic  textile  demand.    Similarly,  in  their 
examination of international banking regulation, Oatley and Nabros (1998) argue that U.S. and 
British banking regulators were able to impose their preferences for capital adequacy standards 
on other advanced industrial countries because the U.S. in p articular enjoyed “financial market 
power” stemming from its international market share in banking and finance.   
 
Richards’ analysis of the effects of market size on regulatory dynamics in the international civil 
aviation  industry  is  particularly  illustrative  as  he  explicitly  models  a  sequential  bargaining 
process that is frequently alleged but rarely specified in the li terature.  International regulatory IE Working Paper                                    DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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negotiations, he argues, take place in the shadow of the reversion point, that is, the set of market 
place rules that a market reverts back to in the absence of a new international agreement.  States 
that  have  “market  power  to  unilaterally  define  market  place  rules”  are  “able  to  dictate  the 
reversion point…and are thereby able to define the choice set available to foreign governments” 
(Richards, 1999:13).  This alters the calculus for bargaining partners, leading them to accept 
international rules that might favor their competitors.
5  After World War II, the physical scope of 
the  British  Empire  at  a  time  when  planes  needed  to  land frequentl y  and  refuel  gave  British 
negotiators  a  bargaining  edge  over  their  U.S. coun terparts.    Once  technological  change  had 
reduced the value of overseas possessions, however, the U.S. could draw on its much larger share 
of  the  international  commercial  aviation  market  to sha pe  market  rules  according  to  its 
preferences.  In each instance, Richards argues, market size and the resulting ability to define the 
reversion point determined whose preferences would be reflected in international rules.   
 
Previous  research  has cl early  established  the  importance  of  market  size  for int ernational 
regulatory influence.  Yet none of the authors cited above opens up the domestic arena where 
most market regulation takes place.  Vogel’s work is an important corrective in this respect and 
provides a stepping stone for the domestic institutional argument developed below (Vogel, 1995; 
1997).  Like Drezner, Vogel views large internal markets as exhibiting a gravitational effect.  In 
addition to the passive regulatory “pull” of large markets, however, Vogel also highlights the 
conscious  “push” o f  domestic  rules  into  international  markets  by  domestic  stakeholders.    In 
competitive  international  markets,  strict  regulatory  standards  can  put  local  producers  at  a 
disadvantage.  Local producers, therefore, have strong incentives to seek an externalization of 
those rules to achieve a level-playing field.  Particularly in areas such as environmental, labor, or 
consumer protection regulation, local producers become natural allies of activists seeking stricter 
international standards.  The resulting coalitions of “baptists and bootleggers” lobby for import 
restrictions  or  other  trade  sanctions  to  affect  foreign  regulatory  dynamics  (DeSombre,  1995; 
2000).  Provided the domestic market is sufficiently large, foreign producers lobby their own 
governments to adopt stricter standards or at least dro p their opposition to similar demands by 
local  activists.    Through  this  simultaneous  “pull”  and “push ,”  large  markets  thus  exert 
considerable influence over international market regulation. 
 
By  focusing  attention  on  the  domestic  political  dynamics  that und erpin  international  market 
regulation, Vogel and DeSombre clearly move beyond authors who treat the domestic arena as a 
black box.  Ye t while adding domestic politics and preferences to the analysis, they share the 
emphasis on material aspects of domestic markets that informs other existing studies.  Market 
size  is  seen  as t he  ultimate  determinant  of  international  regulatory  influence.   Pa tterns  of 
international influence, in turn, should reflect underlying differences in market size across the 
principle protagonists.  Sudden change in influence patterns is unlikely, as international market 
share and the balance of market power tend to shift gradually.   
 
                                                 
5 See also Oatley and Nabors 1998 and Gruber 2000. IE Working Paper                                       DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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Summarizing the core proposition of existing work, we can thus formulate a null hypothesis for 
this study:  
 
  H0: International regulatory influence is a function of domestic market size. 
 
Two corollaries capture derivative propositions and reinforce the null hypothesis: 
 
C01: When two large markets have opposing preferences, international regulatory 
stalemate ensues. 
 
C02: Sudden shifts in patterns of international regulatory influence are due to exogenous 
shocks, such as technological change or market fusion. 
 
The  market  size  approach  provides  a  clear  benchmark  for st udies  of i nternational  market 
regulation.  Yet scholars emphasizing market size have neglected the critical role of domestic 
institutions.    Drawing  on historical  institutional  theory,  the  following  section  develops  a 
corrective to existing arguments.  Market size does not equal market power.  Instead, market 
power is a composite of market size and the domestic regulatory institutions that translate market 
size into regulatory influence.  
 
 
THE ACTIVATION OF MARKET POWER THROUGH REGULATORY CAPACITY 
 
In order for regulators from large markets to promote their domestic agenda internationally, they 
must  have suffi cient  institutional  capacity  to  monitor  and  enforce  their  preferred  rules.  By 
focusing on the role of domestic regulatory institutions, our argument draws on critical insights 
from  and com plements  the  market  size  literature  in  order t o  construct  a  causal  model  that 
integrates the importance of regulatory authority with the coercive power of markets.  
 
The  intuition  behind  the  argument  rests  on  the  micro-institutional  revolution  that has   swept 
political economy over the last two decades.  We start with the fundamental insight of historical 
institutionist  theories  that  political  institutions  enable  and constr ain  political  strategies  and 
outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992; Zysman, 1994; Thelen, 1999).  Following the 
“rediscovery” of the state in comparative politics, the idea that state capacity structures the realm 
of  possible  policy  outcomes  has  become  a stapl e  of  comparative  analysis.    As  Evans, 
Reuschemeyer,  and  Skocpol  explain,  studies  of state c apacity  attempt  to  identify  “specific 
organizational structures the presence (or absence) of which see ms critical to the ability of the 
state authorities to undertake given tasks.  In turn, the presence or absence of organizational 
structures is connected to past state policies, thus underlining the need for historical as well as 
structural  analysis  if  specific  state  capacities  and  incapacities  are  to  be un derstood”  (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985:351).  Policymakers rely on the administrative tools of the 
state  to  implement  and  enforce  their  goals.    The  configuration  of  these  tools  then  constitute IE Working Paper                                    DE8-116-I                               29 - 03 - 2005 
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incentives and constraints that shape the range of viable policy options available to policymakers.  
Rarely  is a sing le  institution  decisive  for  a  particular  outcome.    Instead,  institutional 
complementarities  –  interlocking  and  mutually  reinforcing  micro-institutions  such  as pensio n 
systems, vocational training programs, unemployment regimes, and financial systems – structure 
political and economic change in predictable patterns (Amable, 2000; Hall and Gingerich, 2002; 
Mattli and Büthe, 2003).  This institutional fabric, in turn, not only molds the process of economic 
policymaking  but  also  shapes b usiness  strategies,  national  production  profiles, and increasingly 
constitutes the basis of competitive advantage (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Porter, 1990). 
 
In addition to highlighting the role of state capacity, work in comparative political economy 
underscores the importance of time and timing for the development and deployment of these 
resources (Pierson, 2000; 2004).  The Weberian administrative state was not born in an instant 
but  is ra ther  the  product  of  continuous  institutional  layering  (Thelen,  2003).    State  capacity 
deployed  in  time  T=1  tends  to  have  been  constructed  at  a  previous  point  T=0 a nd  the 
corresponding institutions were naturally conceived with the problems of that time mind.  The 
sequencing of state transformations plays a critical role in the emergence of state capacity and 
therefore  the  character  of  state  capacity  is  heavily  influenced  by  the  legacy  of  its  birth 
environment.  For instance, the progressive era reforms which established an independent civil 
service in the U.S. were critical to the completion of the New Deal forty years later (Skowronek, 
1982).  While states often attempt to construct new administrative capacity in the face of policy 
demands,  existing  institutional  legacies  frequently  delimit  the  range  of  potential  reform  and 
structure actual responses (Pierson, 1993).   
 
The micro-institutional revolution in comparative politics has also spurred new insights in the 
study of comparative market regulation.  Polities systematically differ in their regulatory styles 
due to variation in administrative law, legal procedure, the structure of the judiciary, and the 
ability  of  the  private  sector  to  carry  out  public  objectives  (Badaracco,  1985;  Vogel,  1986; 
Newman and Bach, 2004).  These differences then shape market dynamics.  Kagan, for example, 
has identified a distinct U.S. approach that rests on adversarial legal wrangling among invested 
interests,  delegation  of p olicymaking  authority  to  independent  regulatory  agencies,  and 
contestation of publicly exercised authority in court (Kagan, 2001).  Domestic market regulation, 
in short, is characterized by the regulatory tools policymakers have at their disposal and is shaped 
by the institutional environments in which markets are embedded. 
 
These various insights from the field of comparative political economy are clearly relevant for 
problems of international market regulation confronted by scholars of International Relations.  
Given that state capacity structures the ability of policymakers to formulate and adopt specific 
policies in the domestic arena, it seems self-evident that institutional structures have important 
effects on policies aimed to project domestic rules internationally.  We i ntroduce the notion of 
regulatory capacity to focus analytic attention on the particular institutional tools and capacities 
most relevant to the area of market regulation.  Regulatory capacity, like the larger universe of 
state capacity, evolves over time and is the product of specific historical political circumstances.  
As such, we should expect regulatory capacity to naturally vary across regulatory domains and IE Working Paper                                    DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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jurisdictions.  We define regulatory capacity in the context of international economic governance 
as  a  jurisdiction’s  ability  to  formulate,  monitor,  and  enforce  a set   of  domestic  market  rules.  
Regulatory capacity, in turn, increases the likelihood that these jurisdictions will be able to move 
international outcomes closer to their ideal point.    
 
Jurisdictions with large markets rely on their institutional resources to make demands on foreign 
jurisdictions.  Those jurisdictions, in turn, adjust their regulatory regime when they perceive the 
cost to their national economy of resisting as greater than the c ost of adjustment (Simmons, 
2001).  Regulators making international demands can “punish” a failure to adjust by imposing a 
broad variety of penalties, particularly on foreign firms, including reputational costs associated 
with condemnation, official regulatory fines, or even exclusion from the domestic market.  The 
size  of  the  domestic  market  controlled  by  such  regulators  certainly  determines  the e xtent  of 
potential costs to resistance.  It does not determine the actual cost of non-adjustment, however, 
because the probability of suffering penalties has little to do with market size but rather with the 
credible  threat  of di scovery  and  enforcement.  Critical,  then,  in  the  influence  equation  is the 
foreign jurisdiction’s perception of the demand-making regulator’s ability to monitor and punish 
inaction.  Since regulatory capacity plays a critical role in determining the probability that a 




The process of making regulatory demands on foreign jurisdictions, monitoring compliance, and 
sanctioning  can vary   considerably  in  its  form.   On o ne  end  of  the  spectrum  we  find  pure 
unilateralism, instances where domestic regulators independently craft and implement rules with 
extra-territorial  reach  (Fox,  1997;  2000).    Classical  multilateral  bargaining  in the  context  of 
international  regimes  lies  on t he  other  end  of th e  spectrum  (Richards,  1999;  Cowhey  and 
Richards,  2000).    In-between  there  is  a vari ety  of ot her  forms,  including  transgovernmental 
regulatory networks (Slaughter, 1997; 2004) and bilateral ad-hoc agreements between leading 
jurisdictions (Shaffer, 2002; Pollack and Shaffer, 2001).  Analyzing and comparing the exertion 
of regulatory influence through these different channels is beyond the scope of t his study.  The 
character of regulatory influence exertion is likely to vary across channels.  Without regulatory 
capacity, however, it seems unlikely that market power can be effectively deployed to shape 
international market regulation, regardless of the channel. 
 
It  is  clear  from  the  preceding  discussion  that  regulatory  capacity  is  a mul tidimensional 
phenomenon.  In other words, it is a composite of different domestic institutional attributes.  At a 
minimum,  regulatory  capacity  consists  of  regulatory  expertise,  regulatory  coherence,  and  the 
extent  of  statutory  sanctioning  authority.    Isolating  these  components  allows  us  to  construct 
qualitative measures of regulatory capacity across jurisdictions, sectors, and time.  We model the 
relationship among the three components in a multiplicative fashion, where a score of ze ro on 
any one dimension would produce an overall score of zero.  Figure 1 shows the multidimensional 
                                                 
6 For the importance of political institutions to the provision of credible commitments see North and Weingast 1989 IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                               29 - 03 - 2005 
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character  of  regulatory  capacity  and  highlights  the  continuum  on  each  axis.    Let  us  briefly 
elaborate each dimension. 
 
Figure 1: The Three Dimensions of Regulatory Capacity 
 
 
Regulatory expertise encompasses the ability to identify regulatory challenges, develop policy 
solutions,  implement  these  solutions,  and  provide  competent  monitoring.   At a  minimum, 
developing an international regulatory strategy requires staff with sufficient training to identify 
areas of concern within the domestic economy and to enforce policy solutions on third countries.  
Comprehensive budgetary resources, experience due to y ears in existence, and a high level of 
professional staffing thus all demonstrate regulatory expertise.
7  Regulators with few internal 
resources and minimal staff find it difficult to formulate international initiatives and press their 
agenda against foreign jurisdictions.  Those with substantial experience and staffing, by contrast, 




Regulatory  capacity  also  requires  the  coherence  of  regulatory  authority  in  a  policy  domain.  
Coherence  depends  on  a  clear  delegation  of  regulatory  authority  in a   policy  domain  so  that 
multiple agencies are not vying against one another to define the regulatory agenda.  All else 
being equal, the more coherent regulatory authority is, the easier it is to formulate externalization 
strategies  and  the  more  credible  the  commitment  to  monitoring  and enforcem ent.
9  T h i r d  
                                                 
7 For promising efforts to measure a regulator’s power along these dimensions, see Gilardi 2002. 
8 Carpenter 2001 examines the importance of expertise for bureaucratic entrepreneurship. 
9 The importance of the coherence variable is tested and confirmed in a large sample statistical setting in Mattli and 
Büthe 2003. IE Working Paper                                      DE8-116-I                               29 - 03 - 2005 
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countries  have  little  incentive  to  adjust  their  domestic  rules,  if the re gulator  demanding 
adjustment is competing at home with other agencies that pursue rival strategies.  The importance 
of regulatory coherence should not be confused with the potential bargaining power conferred to 
international negotiators serving contested national interests.  Following the two-level game logic 
presented  by  Putnam,  international  negotiators  may  indeed  find  their  bargaining  position 
strengthened  when  they  can  employ  squabbling  domestic  actors  to c onstrain  their  ability  to 
compromise (Putnam, 1988; Milner, 1997).  The coherence concept, by contrast, captures the 
idea that a single actor can claim authority to represent a jurisdiction at the international level, 
regardless  of  the  number  of dom estic  interests  they  might  represent.    In  general,  regulatory 
coherence should be greater when regulatory authority for an issue area has been delegated to a 
specific regulatory body with the power to shape and enforce market rules (Gilardi, 2002).   
 
Finally,  a crit ical  determinant  of regulatory   capacity  is  the  extent  of  statutory  authority  that 
regulators command.  As noted above, regulatory capacity depends on the ability to punish those 
that do not adjust.  The extent of statutory sanctioning authority can be identified in facilitating 
legislation for a regulatory domain.  The most straightforward means to punish non-adjustment is 
to  ban  market  entry,  that  is,  to  selectively  exclude  foreign  firms  from t he  domestic  market.  
Agencies may also have the authority to fine foreign firms or serve a s ombudsman capable of 
exacting reputational costs.  Regulators that lack the power to punish inaction have diminished 
ability  to  export  their  domestic  regulation  because  foreign  jurisdictions  have  no  incentive  to 
adjust.  The pol itical and institutional ability to leverage market access to achieve international 
compliance is thus critical.   
 
As  noted  above,  we  model  the  relationship  of re gulatory  capacity’s  three  dimensions  in 
multiplicative – as oppo sed to additive – fashion.  Intuitively, a void in regulatory expertise, a 
total  lack  of statu tory  authority  to  sanction,  or c omplete  regulatory  incoherence  implies  the 
absence of regulatory capacity.  A hypothetical score of zero on any one dimension, in other 
words, leaves overall regulatory capacity at zero.  More realistically, the multiplicative character 
of regulatory capacity suggests that scoring well on all three dimensions is more conducive to 
commanding substantial regulatory capacity than high marks on just one or t wo.  Figure 2, for 
instance, sketches a hypothetical situation where jurisdiction J1 would command greater overall 
regulatory capacity than jurisdiction J2 despite scoring lower on both regulatory expertise and 
regulatory  coherence.   The re ason  is  that  jurisdiction  J1  has  considerably  greater  statutory 
authority  and can t hus  more  effectively  promote  its  interests,  even  though  others  may  have 
greater expertise.  
 IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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Figure 2: Comparing Regulatory Capacity  
 
 
With a more robust conception of regulatory capacity, it is possible to articulate a core hypothesis 
in clear contrast to the null hypothesis stressing only market size: 
 
H1: The greater a jurisdiction’s regulatory capacity in an industry, the greater its ability 
to activate power vested in its market size to shape international market rules according 
to its preferences.  
 
A jurisdiction’s ability to promote its rules internationally depends on i ts domestic regulatory 
institutions.  These institutions underpin a jurisdiction’s capacity to monitor and enforce its rules 
and thereby provide the resources necessary to stimulate regulatory adjustment abroad.  H1 also 
leads to a set of corollaries in clear contrast to those from the null hypothesis presented above: 
 
C11: Jurisdictions with greater regulatory capacity may be able to shape international 
market regulation even when there is relative parity in market size.   
 
While existing arguments focusing on market size predict opposing camps and rival rules in the 
case of relative market parity, we argue that discrepancies in regulatory capacity can decidedly 
tilt the balance toward one camp as regulatory capacity can impose non-adjustment costs even on 
comparably large markets.  Issue hegemony may thus result despite preference conflicts among 
the great powers. 
 
C12: Shifts in international regulatory influence are lagged against domestic institutional 
change in large markets. 
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The distribution of international regulatory influence may not only shift in response to exogenous 
technological or market shocks, as existing work focusing on market size asserts, but rather can 
be due to institutional or political reform within leading jurisdictions that alters their regulatory 
capacity  in a   given industry .    This  means  that  influence  may  increase  as  market  size  stays 
constant but regulatory authority grows. 
 
In order to scrutinize the importance of regulatory capacity for market power we examine the 
arguments in two historical narratives – international securities and transborder personal data 
flows.  Owing to the transnational character of these industries, the chance of regulatory conflict 
is high and the two therefore represent ideal cases for examining international market regulation.  
Additionally, over the thirty-year period under study international securities and personal data 
regulation offer significant across and with-in case variation.  In the securities case, the U.S. 
successfully projected regulatory influence in the 1980s but has seen its dominant position erode 
since the late 1990s.  In the case of data privacy, Europe promoted its rules throughout the 1990s 
and  only  recently  has  been  challenged  in  the  area  of nati onal  security-relevant  personal 
information.  The cases also incorporate varying levels of regulatory capacity as both the U.S. 
and Europe reformed domestic regulatory institutions during the time period.  Finally, the sectors 
represent substantively vital economic activity for the U.S. and Europe, the regions on which we 
focus.  A lot was therefore at stake, and governments consequently sought to shape the rules 
governing international markets in their favor as best as they could. 
 
 
FROM US DOMINANCE TO TRANSATLANTIC DIALOG: THE CASE OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
 
The value of cross-border financial flows has reached staggering levels (Simmons, 1999).  At the 
same  time,  the  ability  to  attract  investment  and t he  cost  of fi nancing  has  become  critical 
determinants of national and regional competitive advantage.  Financial market regulation then is 
perhaps  the  most  important  segment  of  international  economic  governance.   There is l ittle 
disagreement that the U.S. is home to the world’s largest and most vibrant financial markets, and 
that U.S. banks, brokerages, and securities firms have dominant international positions.  Simmons 
speaks for many when she concludes that “the United States is hegemonic in finance in the sense 
that it is costlier to alter its preferred regulatory innovation than to try to change the policies of 
the rest of the world” (Simmons, 2001:595).  America’s vast financial markets, in short, not only 
make conscious regulatory export rational; they are also the reason why such a strategy can work. 
 
Indeed,  U.S.  securities  regulation  has si gnificantly  impacted  regulatory  dynamics  around  the 
world.  The diffusion of rules banning insider trading is particularly telling, as toleration of such 
practices is sharply at odds with American principles of transparency and investor protection.
10  
In 1980, only eleven of sixty-seven countries with stock exchanges banned insider trading.  The 
                                                 
10 Insider trading is “buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security.”  See 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last accessed 26 February 2004). IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                              29 - 03 - 2005 
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UK, Japan, Hong Kong, and Germany are just some of the global financial centers that lacked such 
rules.  In sharp contrast, by 1998, eighty-three of now ninety-seven countries with stock exchanges 
had outlawed insider trading.  In less than two decades, insider trading regulation spread from just 
16 percent of markets to a remarkable 85 percent (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). 
 
Moreover, whereas a majority of securities markets two decades ago featured stock exchange 
self-regulation, central bank oversight, or r egulation through finance ministries, the American 
model anchored on an independent regulatory agency has replaced institutional alternatives in 
virtually  all m ajor  markets.
11   As sessing  regulatory  reform  in  the  UK,  Japan,  Germany,  and 
Korea, Laurence concludes that “[a]ll four new agencies resemble each other in several important 
respects,  and  all  were  modeled,  at  least  in  part,  on  the  [U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission].”  This, he writes, is part of a “broad trend in which different countries are adopting 
American-style institutions of investor protection” (Laurence, 1999:647). 
 
It  would  be mislea ding  to vi ew  such adju stments  in  evolutionary  terms  as  the  inevitable 
byproduct of the growing maturity of non-U.S. financial markets.  First, regulatory emulation in 
Europe and elsewhere has been very costly.  The interlocking ownership and cross-shareholder 
system is at the heart of German corporate governance, for example, makes effectively banning 
insider trading a real challenge.  Germany consequently long resisted, adopting insider trading 
rules only in 1994 as part of a far-reaching reorganization of its financial system (Cioffi, 2002).  
Moreover, several scholars argue that inside r trading is not incompatible with well-functioning 
securities  markets  (Manne,  1966;  Carlton  and  Fischel,  1983;  Haddock  and  Macey,  1986).  
Second, several European markets acquired and defended their roles as leading financial centers 
without adopting U.S. securities regulation.  The London Stock Exchange, for example, asserted 
its  second-place  position  in  the wo rld  despite  being  governed unti l  1988  by  a  private  self-
regulatory system.  Third, while economists argue that the rise of institutional investors provided 
market  incentives  for  the  emulation  of  U.S. r egulation,  European count ries  appear  to  have 
stubbornly ignored such incentives, moving toward the American model only in the 1990s.  In 
short, the diffusion of U.S. se curities regulation cannot be reduced to an intrinsic attribute of 
maturing markets.   
 
Nevertheless, Europe has been largely on the receiving end of U.S. regul atory exports over the 
past three decades.  Transatlantic relations in this area have long resembled a one-way street.  
When European regulators sought to turn the tables and force their American counterparts in the 
early 1990s to adopt European capital adequacy standards for securities firms, they were sharply 
                                                 
11 From its creation in 1986 until well into the 1990s, for example, stock exchanges, central banks, and government 
ministries, in addition to regulatory agencies, were members of the leading international securities forum.  Today, all 
government ministries and more than a dozen stock exchanges have been replaced by newly create regulatory 
agencies.  In no case has an agency been replaced by a central bank, government ministry, or self-regulatory 




12  Likewise, the U.S. vetoed European efforts to move toward mutual recognition of 
financial disclosure standards.   
 
In recent years, however, European regulators have made significant inroads and have seen their 
international regulatory influence grow considerably.
13  Consider three specific instances: 
 
  In 2002, the EU adopted new rules mandating “consolidated regulation,” i.e. oversight by 
a single regulator of all operations of a fi nancial conglomerate across types of financial 
services and jurisdictions.
14  Non-EU regul ators can serve in t his capacity if they meet 
equivalency standards.  U.S. re gulators did not meet these standards and thus – under 
pressure from internationally-operating U.S. financial firms – had to substantially revise 
domestic rules to meet European demands. 
 
  Europe successfully pressured U.S. regulators to exempt European companies listed on 
American  exchanges  –  and  European  auditors  of  such  companies  –  from  certain 
extraterritorial applications of the newly enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
15 
 
  After having long resisted European demands to permit the use of non-U.S. accounting 
standards by foreign companies listed on American exchanges, U.S. regulators are now 
actively  promoting  the  relative  convergence  of U.S.  GAAP  and  the  International 
Accounting Standards that will be mandatory on all European exchanges starting 2005.
16 
 
In contrast to the long period of US issue hegemony in securities regulation, U.S. regulators made 
important  concessions  to  meet  European  regulatory  demands  over the  last  few  years.    They 
exempted European firms from extraterritorial U.S. regulations and revised domestic rules to 
accommodate extraterritorial provisions of new European regulation.  Thus, Simmons’ claim that 
it is costlier for the U.S. to alter its domestic regulation than to get foreign jurisdictions to comply 
with U.S. preferences appears not to hold.  What can explain past U.S. dominance and the more 




If U.S. international regulatory hegemony in the securities industry in the 1980s and early 1990s 
was indeed rooted in the dominance of America’s financial markets, a recent catching-up of 
Europeans might explain the current, more balanced regulatory dynamics.  Indeed, European 
policymakers  hoped  that  the i ntroduction  of  the  Euro  would  boost  the  relative  standing  of 
                                                 
12 See Tracy Corrigan, “SEC and regulators deadlocked over capital requirements,” Financial Times, 30 October 
1992, 31, and Richard Waters, “IOSCO drops common capital rules plan,” Financial Times, 11 February 1993, 29. 
13 The following section draws on Posner 2004. 
14 “A bit of give and take,” The Economist, 17 October 2002. 
15 Jon Ashworth, “US regulator hints at accounting compromise,” The Times, 11 October 2002, 27, and Sharon 
Ward, “EU hands list of corporate reforms complaints to US,” The Scotsman, 1 December 2002, 3.  
16 Floyd Norris, “U.S. and European Securities Officials Vow Cooperation,” The New York Times, 5 June 2004, 3. IE Working Paper                                           WP05-15                                29 - 03 - 2005 
 
  14
European  markets  and  firms.   Yet  there  is li ttle  evidence  Europe’s  common  currency  has 
challenged  the  dollar’s  preeminence,  whether a s  reserve  currency,  denominator  of  critical 
commodities, or for securities underwriting (Cohen, 2003).  But more importantly, longitudinal 
data on relative market size appears inversely related to the patterns of international regulatory 
influence described above (figure 2). 
 
 









































































Note: the first column for each year is the sum of figures for the UK, France, Germany, Italy, 
and the Netherlands.  The second column is the sum  of U.S. markets.  Ratios are two-year 
moving averages.   
 
Source: Securities Industry Association Factbook 2002. 
 
 
Between 1983 and 1991, the period when U.S. regul ators began the conscious export of U.S. 
securities market regulation, the size ratio of U.S. and major European markets fell from almost 
five to less than two.  During the period that European markets appeared closest to America’s in 
terms of size – the early 1990s – the U.S. frequently and effectively rebuffed European regulatory 
demands.  Lastly – with the market size ratio largely stabilized at the two-and-a-half mark since 
the end of the 1990s – nothing in the data would suggest growing European influence.  How can 
we  explain  strong  U.S.  influence  at  a  time  when i t  should  have been fadi ng,  and g rowing 









The domestic institutional view focuses attention on U.S. regulatory capacity vested above all in 
the SEC.  Charged with investor protection by assuring fair and transparent markets, the SEC is 
the  prototypical  administrative  agency  of the New Dea l.    Its  independent  rule-making, 
investigative, and enforcement powers have grown steadily since its creation, and particularly 
since the 1960s when it obtained additional congressional authority to wage a crusade against 
illegal insider trading.  One influential U.S. senator has called it “the strongest single unit that I 
know in the federal government.”
17  Located at the center of a domestic epistemic community of 
specialized securities lawyers and academics, the Commission has vast expertise at its disposal.  
In short, on all three dimensions of regulatory capacity, the U.S. se curities sector scores high.  
The U.S. was therefore well- positioned to respond to the challenges posed by the international 
integration of securities markets. 
 
Financial  globalization  following  the  collapse  of  Bretton  Woods  and  the  abolition  of c apital 
controls  meant  that cross-nati onal  regulatory  heterogeneity  opened  arbitrage  opportunities.  
America, with its combination of high regulatory standards and attractive markets, was most 
vulnerable.  SEC regulators felt this vulnerability acutely in the early 1980s when Swiss banking 
secrecy laws obstructed the prosecution of the two largest insider trading cases in SEC history.
18  
In the words of one Commissioner in 1983 (Longstreth, 1983:1610),  
 
Leadership  in  developing  an  appropriate  international  system  of  securities  regulation  will  present  an 
important challenge to the Commission in the  years ahead.  As transactions become easier to accomplish 
abroad, the Commission will become increasingly tempted to lower its standards of investor protection in 
order to prevent the flight of securities transactions beyond its reach.  The trick wi ll be to enco urage the 
securities  regulators  of  the  other  major  trading  nations  to  develop  systems  that  provide  protections  to 
investors substantially similar to those provided in this country while trimming away regulations that are not 
essential to assure those protections. 
 
Drawing  on  its  substantial  regulatory  expertise,  its  considerable  statutory  authority,  and  the 
attractiveness of U.S. markets to foreign investors, the SEC devised a carrot-and-stick strategy 
for  regulatory  export.    First,  it  publicly  toyed  with  the  idea  of e xcluding  anyone  from  U.S. 
markets who did not voluntarily wave foreign legal privileges.
19  Against the backdrop of this 
stick, the SEC approached foreign authorities to negotiate bilateral Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU) to facilitate information sharing and enforcement assistance in the fight against cross-
border securities fraud.  Twenty years later, a dense network of MoUs has become the bedrock of 
regulatory cooperation in the industry.
20  It was after this initial muscle flexing that the SEC 
endorsed the creation of IOSCO as a forum for securities regulators. Thus, rather than passively 
                                                 
17 Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, as quoted in Laurence 1999, p. 660. 
18 For an account of these two cases – St. Joe Minerals Corp. and Santa Fe International – see Bach 2004. 
19 SEC regulators floated this “waiver-by-conduct”-idea publicly trough a rule-making notice and a law review 
article.  See Fedders, et al. 1984 
20 More than 250 bilateral MoUs were in force in 2001.  The SEC is signatory to about fifty, making it the largest 
single network hub.  See Bach 2004. IE Working Paper                                     DE8-116-I                            29 - 03 - 2005 
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relying on the draw of U.S. markets, the SEC has employed its regulatory capacity to proactively 
shape international rules according to its preferences.   
 
European securities markets have not surpassed the U.S.  There is also no indication that the U.S. 
has lost regulatory capacity.  What then explains the trend toward a new tr ansatlantic balance?  
European countries did not command extensive regulatory capacity during the 1980s and into the 
1990s.  In key markets, independent regulators did not exist or had just been created.  In several 
cases, stock exchanges or lower-level finance ministry officials represented European countries 
within IOSCO.  Where independent regulators did exist, they often had few personnel, little 
expertise,  and  limited  enforcement  powers.    Most  importantly,  there  was  scant  coordination 
among European regulators.  However, a series of i nternal regulatory reforms has significantly 
boosted  Europe’s  regulatory  capacity, enabling  it to  influence  international dynamics (Jabko, 
2004; Posner, 2004).  
 
Europe’s move away from various forms of self- and ministerial regulation and toward SEC-style 
independent agency regulation is well-documented (Moran, 1994; Cerny, 1989; Lütz, 1998).  The 
EU’s Investment Services Directive merely formalized the process, requiring all member states to 
create independent regulators – a process completed in 1994 after Germany’s reforms.  In the 
middle of the 1990s, cooperation among these regulatory agencies intensified.  Ironically, the 
form of regulatory cooperation spearheaded by the SEC became the basis of these efforts.  An 
original  set  of bi lateral  MoUs  were  replaced  by  a  multilateral  MoU  in  1997,  and  European 
regulators created the Forum of European Securities Commission (FESCO) as Europe’s IOSCO 
equivalent.  While technically not an EU  body, FESCO became increasingly important for the 
coordination of European securities regulation and cross-border securities law enforcement. 
 
Cognizant  that  financial  market  integration  in  Europe  was  lagging  behind  expectations,  the 
European  Commission  pressed  for  further  reform.    A  committee  chaired  by  Alexandre 
Lamfalussy recommended sweeping changes, including the formal incorporation of FESCO into 
EU  policymaking.    Renamed  the  Committee  of  European  Securities  Regulators  (CESR),  the 
group  has bee n  strengthened  considerably  and  has  become  a  formal  pillar  of a n  integrating 
European securities regime.  It is through this institutional arrangement that European regulators 
have  been a ble  to  coordinate  positions  with  the  European  Commission  on  issues suc h  as 
consolidated regulation, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the mandatory use of International 
Accounting Standards in Europe that paved the way for an international agreement, and to back-
up regulatory demands with possible sanctions ranging all the way to market exclusion. 
 
In sum, while the introduction of the Euro has neither flipped the market size gap to the U.S. nor 
fully  integrated  Europe’s  various  securities  markets,  the  last  few y ears  have  witnessed  a 
considerable integration of European securities regulation that has boosted regulatory capacity.  
Paradoxically, these reforms have in no small part grown out of previous U.S. regulatory export.  
The global triumph of the SEC model of regulation through powerful independent agencies and 
efforts to link regulators through MoUs and multilateral forums have provided Europeans with 
the building blocks of regulatory capacity.  The simultaneous development of regulatory capacity IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                              29 - 03 - 2005 
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within each member state and close integration across European markets has enabled Europe to 
deploy market power in the securities field, undermine SEC hegemony, and bring about a more 
balanced transatlantic dynamic. 
 
EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: THE CASE OF DATA  PRIVACY  
 
With the rise of technologies such as the Internet, personal data can now be digitally transmitted 
instantaneously across the globe at almost no cost.  Companies and governments wish to employ 
such data to segment markets and enhance security.  These efforts, however, confront unique 
national regulatory environments that have evolved over the past thirty years (Bennett, 1992).  In 
the  1970s,  a g roup  of Europ ean  countries,  including  Germany  and  France,  adopted 
comprehensive  legislation  that  established  clear  privacy  principles  for  the  public  and  private 
sector enforced by independent regulatory agencies.  An other set of countries that included the 
U.S. focused instead on threats posed by public sector data use only, relegating private sector 
issues to industry self-regulation (Schwartz and Reidenberg, 1996).  
 
In the last ten years, however, the EU has dominated global privacy debates and has effectively 
promoted the comprehensive model.  Passed in 1995, the EU data privacy directive required that 
all member states adopt comprehensive legislation.  Additionally, the directive includes an extra-
territorial provision that limits the transfer of personal information from Europe to third-countries 
that do not have adequate privacy legislation (Simitis, 1995).  Five member states – Belgium, 
Greece,  Italy,  Portugal,  and  Spain  –  passed  data  privacy  rules  because  of the directi ve.  
Additionally, over twenty non-member states have adopted comprehensive rules.  All members 
of the OECD – except for the U.S. – now have comprehensive rules in place or pending in their 
legislatures.   I n  total, nea rly  thirty  countries  from  five  continents  have em ulated  European 
standards (Council of Europe, 2004).     
 
Although the U.S. has wage d a vocal international campaign against Europe’s approach, it has 
not been able to contain the spread of European rules.  Seven countries – including key markets 
such as Japan, Canada, and Australia – that had previously shared the U.S. system of protection 
have  adopted  the  EU com prehensive  system.   Eu rope  even  forced  the  U.S.  itself  to  make 
concessions.  After considerable transatlantic tensions, the two sides settled the dispute about the 
(in-)adequacy of American rules through the adoption of the so-called Safe Harbor agreement.  
The agreement requires that U.S. firms active in European markets abide by EU rules even when 
data  is  processed  in  the  U.S.
21    Faced  with  higher  operational  costs,  it  is unl ikely  that 
multinational companies will maintain dual data processing standards for their international and 
U.S.  clients.   Whi le  the  U.S. c ontinues  to st all  on  reforming  domestic  data  privacy  rules, 
European regulations have thus become the de-facto international standard.   
 
                                                 
21 As of 2004, nearly 600 U.S. companies have signed on to the Safe Harbor agreement, including such high-profile 
companies as IBM, Marriott, and Microsoft.  These firms pledge to abide by EU rules and permit enforcement either 
by the Federal Trade Commission or European data protection officials directly.  See Farrell 2003. IE Working Paper                                       DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
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Europe’s international leadership in privacy regulation awards it a strategic edge in  one of the 
pivotal emerging areas of economic governance.  Companies across a broad range of sectors view 
personal  information  as  “information  capital”  that  they  can  exploit  to  reduce  risk and  to 
customize products and marketing.  Strict data privacy policies put limits on the commodification 
of personal information.  A recent survey of leading U.S. financial services companies suggests 
that the free flow of information earns the financial services industry alone about $17 billion 
annually (Glassman, 2000).  Moreover, in the U.S., a new industry has sprung up that depends on 
lax personal data regulation.  Some of these “data compilers” – firms that gather information 
from diverse sources and sell it to other firms – have become billion-dollar businesses.
22  Such 
vibrant personal data trading contrast sharply with European markets, where strict privacy rules 
limit the transfer of personal information.  Private sector credit reporting – a huge business in the 
U.S. – does not exist in France, for example.  Most European companies by now firmly reject the 
idea of releasing customer data to third parties. 
 
Despite Europe’s general dominance in the international regulation of data privacy, the U.S. has 
had some recent success in asserting its interests in the field of security.  In a well-publicized 
dispute, the U.S. demanded that all international airlines provide the U.S. customs with detailed 
passenger  records  concerning  those  flying  into  the  U.S.    This  demand  conflicted  with  the 
European privacy directive, which limits the transfer of sensit ive information to countries with 
inadequate privacy protection such as the U.S.  After several rounds of heated negotiations, the 
EU agreed to deliver some of the requested information.
23   
 
As  is  evident,  personal  data  regulation  is  strategically  important  in  the  information  age, 
significantly  influences  market  dynamics  across se ctors,  and h as  considerable  distributional 
implications.  Given the high stakes and the extent of America’s global influence in the areas of 
information technology and electronic commerce, why has Europe been able to export its strict 
privacy rules?  And why after years of impotence in the policy domain has the U.S. successfully 




While Europe has developed robust markets for electronic commerce and information services 
over the last several years, it still trails in comparison to the U.S.  What is true today is even truer 
for the time between 1990 and 2000, a period marked by the passage of the EU privacy directive, 
the onset of European regulatory export, and the conclusion of the transatlantic Safe Harbor 
agreement. Regardless of methodology, all estimates suggest that Europe lags behind the U.S. in 
international  electronic  commerce  (Uncapher,  2000).    Forrester re search  group,  for e xample, 
estimates that global business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce revenue reached $657 million in 
2000.  Of this, the U.S accounted for $480 million while Europe had the second largest market at 
$87 million (Forrester Research, 2000). 
                                                 
22 “A golden vein,” The Economist, 10 June 2004. 




America’s  leadership  in  the  area  of e-commerce and  digital information  services  held  across 
markets and industries (figure 3).  In critical B2C segments, the online share of transactions in the 
U.S. was around three times higher than in Europ e.  For our  purposes, the area of financial 
brokerage  is  particularly  interesting,  as  such  transactions  routinely involve sensitive  personal 
information.  In 1999, more than 15 percent of all retail financial brokerage transactions in the 
U.S. took place over the web.  In Europe, the comparable figure was 5.5 percent.  Given that 
these two markets account for the majority of such transactions worldwide, the figure suggest that 
the U.S. accounted for the lion’s share of global B2C financial brokerage transactions.  
 



















































































































Source: The Economist 2000 
 
Another useful measure to assess levels of personal information trade in a country is the number 
of deployed secure web servers, which are required to safely handle sensitive information such as 
credit card data.  In 199 9, the U.S. led Europe wit h over 31,000 servers compared to roughly 
9,000.  In 2002, Europe’s 28,000 servers still trailed the U.S. with  90,000.  The U.S. figure 
accounted for 65 percent of all secure servers in the OECD in 2002 (OECD, 2002:60).  The trend 
line  depicted  in  figure  4  suggests t hat  European  markets  are  unlikely  to  surpass  their U.S. 
equivalents any time soon. IE Working Paper                                    DE8-116-I                               29 - 03 - 2005 
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While  the  EU  asserted  international  authority  and  began  to  successfully  export  its  privacy 
standards, European markets were trailing America’s considerably.  At the same time that Europe 
dominated privacy debates, the U.S. successfully leveraged its market leadership in several key 
areas  of  e-commerce  and  Internet  regulation,  including  intellectual  property,  taxation, 
trademarks, and domain names.
24  Additionally, the recent assertion of U.S. preferences in the 
dispute  over  airline  passenger  records  cannot  be  explained by  a shift  in relative market size 
between the two regions.  In short, even across information services regulatory influence has 




Despite the limited size of European digital markets, Europe has considerable regulatory capacity 
in  the  area  of  privacy  and  an ext ensive  regulatory  tradition.   Wit h  the  passage  of  the  first 
comprehensive  privacy  policy  in  Sweden,  various  European  countries  created  independent 
regulatory agencies with significant monitoring and enforcement powers.   Buffered from direct 
political control, European data protection agencies are characterized by budgetary autonomy, 
non-political technocratic leadership, and high levels of professional staffing.  They have broad 
jurisdiction over issues concerned with data privacy.  While the exact regulatory powers and 
procedures differ cross-nationally, data protection agencies have the authority to regulate the 
transfer of personal information to third countries, monitor and investigate complaints, review 
relevant legislation, leverage public opinion through the media, and at times directly punish non-
                                                 
24 Interestingly, these are all cases where the U.S. possessed or has created considerable regulatory capacity.  See 
Franda 2001 and Bach 2004. IE Working Paper                                     DE8-116-I                              29 - 03 - 2005 
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compliance through administrative fines (Flaherty, 1989).  They are, in short, the embodiment of 
substantial European regulatory capacity in this area.  
 
The passage of the EU directive not only mandated strong data privacy regimes for all member 
states, but also created institutional mechanisms for intra-European coordination and external 
projection.  For instance, the directive explicitly granted European regulators statutory authority 
over European market access.  Regulators can block information flows from Europe to third-
countries  that  lack  adequate  privacy  standards.   T o  this  end,  the  directive  created  a 
transgovernmental body of member state data protection authorities – the Article 29 Group – that 
reviews third-country legislation, makes adequacy determinations, and more generally advises on 
EU data policy (Swire and Litan, 1998).  So far, the Group has declared the Swiss, Canadian, and 
Hungarian systems as adequate, while rejecting the Australian system as too lenient.  At the same 
time,  relying  on  their  individual  authorities,  national  data  protection  agencies  have  fined 
companies  that  fail  to  meet  European  standards  and  have  thereby  affected  interest  group 
preferences  and  coalitions  in  third-countries.
25    In  sum,  by  institutionalizing  market  access 
control at the EU level, the pri vacy directive has significantly augmented already considerable 
European regulatory capacity in this area. 
 
At the same time that the directive has increased market control, it has created the foundation for 
greater  coherence  of  European  regulatory  efforts.    The  directive  established  a  permanent 
secretariat for the Article 29 Group that is run by the European Commission.  This means that 
national regulators are in constant contact with one another, have resources such as simultaneous 
translation facilities, and have gained the stature of an official European regulatory voice.  As 
leading experts, the group collectively interprets and monitors the implementation of the directive 
for the EU, and its opinions have considerable clout.  
 
Whereas European markets feature extensive regulatory capacity along all three dimensions – 
expertise,  coherence,  and  statutory  authority – the  U.S. has little to show in  this field.  The 
decision in the 1970s to forego comprehensive privacy protection, not to create a regulatory 
agency,  and  to  only  monitor  public  sector  personal  data  use  has  retarded  the  formation  of 
regulatory expertise and perpetuated fragm entation of any U.S. regulatory authority.  On the 
federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  and th e  Federal  Communication  Commission 
variably  claim authority  for privacy concerns although none have dedicated privacy officers.  
There is virtually no coordination among these various public authorities, however, which limits 
their influence in international debates.  With respect to private sector monitoring, a multitude of 
self-regulatory organizations carry a large share of the burden.  Relying primarily on reputation 
mechanisms  –  the  granting  and  removing  of pri vacy  seals  –  they  lack  the  sweeping  market 
exclusion powers of European regulator agencies.
26   
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Given  the  U.S.’s  weak  position  in  international  privacy  debates,  it  is  interesting  to  note  its 
success in the filed of airline passenger records.  While changes in market size cannot account for 
this shift, the inclusion of regulatory capacity provides a rather persuasive explanation.  While the 
U.S. has long lagged in regulatory capacity in the privacy sphere, it has tremendous capacity in 
the area of border control and airline regulation.   Homeland security legislation passed since the 
9/11 terrorist attacks has empowered U.S. customs officials to block flights between the U.S. and 
nations  that  fail  to  comply  with  passenger  data  transfer  requirements.
27   Additi onally,  the 
Department of Homeland Security appointed a chief privacy officer in 2003 who is responsible 
for  monitoring  the  privacy  implications  of  U.S.  security  policy.    When  U.S.  and  European 
officials  negotiated  the  issue  of pass enger  information,  the  U.S.  thus  brought  a  domestically 
empowered privacy expert to the table.  While the U.S. c ertainly forced the EU to weaken its 
stance on cross-border personal information transfers, it is important to note that the U.S. had to 
make  a se ries  of com promises  as  well.  The ini tial  U.S. de mand  required  all  passenger 
information,  including  such se nsitive  information  as  meal  preferences  which coul d  denote 
religious affiliation, to be transferred.  EU privacy regulators strongly protested this carte blanche 
policy and won limits on the extent of information provided.
28 
 
In sum, despite its relatively small share of global e-commerce markets, the EU – not the U.S. – 
has set the de-facto international privacy standard.   Already enjoying considerable regulatory 
capacity in the personal data field at the dawn of the Internet revolution, European policymakers 
have  augmented  this  capacity,  integrating  it  at  the  EU level,  and  thereby  made  possible  the 
deliberate export of the comprehensive regulatory model.  While the size of U.S. markets may 
have been the reason why the country was able to negotiate the Safe Harbor agreement – cutting 
off data flows to the U.S., after all, would have pained Europeans more than in the case of, say, 
Chile – the U.S. has  not been able to prevent the global spread of European standards.  With 
many large U.S. companies now subjected to EU rules through the Safe Harbor Agreement, and 
the U.S. fairly isolated internationally, it may just be a matter of time until the U.S. has (in-
)formally  adopted  comprehensive  regulation  as we ll.    The  case  of  airline  passenger  data, 
however, strikes an important counter point.  Here, the U.S. has resisted European convergence 
pressure by leveraging its considerable regulatory capacity in customs and airline policy.  
 
 
                                                 
27 American officials threatened to deny landing rights and fine companies six thousand dollars per passenger for 
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28 See Philip Shenon, “US and Europeans Agree on Sharing of Airline Passenger Data,” The New York Times, 17 
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EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
The historical narratives provide considerable evidence for an evaluation of the two principal 
arguments.      The  market  size  argument  offers  valuable  insights.   J urisdictions  with  sizable 
markets disproportionately influence international market regulation.  In  both cases – securities 
and personal data – th e U.S. and EU have played the dominant roles internationally.
29 Yet the 
null hypothesis that international regulatory influence is determined by market size alone is not 
supported by the evidence.  If m arket size alone determined influence, Europe should not have 
made inroads in international securities regulation and its efforts to export data privacy standards 
should have failed.  The first corollary derived from the market size argument – that si zable 
markets with opposing preferences lead to international fragmentation – fares poorly as well.  
The case of personal data regulation powerfully refutes the claim.  Europe and the U.S. have 
espoused sharply differing approaches to privacy protection and European rules have become the 
de-facto international standard, U.S. efforts to the contrary notwithstanding.  Even traditional 
U.S. allies such as Canada and Japan have moved toward the European model.  Additionally, 
large U.S. companies have agreed to subject themselves to comprehensive rules enforced either 
by  the  FTC o r  European  data  protection  authorities  directly.    The  U.S. “ camp”  has  quickly 
dissipated to a group of privacy protection slackers isolated in global regulatory debates.   
 
The second corollary derived from the market size claim fares poorly as well.  The logic of the 
market size argument suggests that shifts in the pattern of international regulatory influence in an 
industry should generally be gradual, as market size itself changes gradually.  Sudden shifts, as 
Richards observed for the case of international aviation markets, should be due to exogenous 
factors  such  as  technological  change or   the fusion   of  previously  distinct  markets.   Yet  the 
evidence shows this argument to be overly restrictive.  In the case of securities regulation, Europe 
fairly quickly and unexpectedly asserted international influence after many years on the receiving 
end.  This shift was not due to exogenous technological change or the sudden full integration of 
European  securities  markets  after  the  introduction  of  the  Euro.  Instead,  as anti cipated  in  the 
second  corollary  of  the  regulatory  capacity  argument,  the  ability  to  project  international 
regulatory influence is rooted in domestic and EU-wide institutional reforms that have augmented 
Europe’s  regulatory  capacity.    It  was  America’s  conscious  export  of SEC-st yle  securities 
regulation  and i ts  push  for r egulatory  cooperation  that,  paradoxically,  played  an  important 
catalytic role in Europe’s regulatory evolution. 
 
In general, the main hypothesis capturing the role of domestic regulatory capacity fares better.  In 
each case, and reinforced by considerable within-case variation, high regulatory capacity over a 
sizeable market is associated with significant international regulatory influence.  Jurisdictions 
that successfully exported domestic rules or won important foreign concessions – the U.S. in 
securities, the EU recently in securities, and the EU in data privacy – had domestic regulatory 
regimes characterized by high levels of regulatory expertise, regulatory coherence, and statutory 
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authority that included the ability to deny access to the domestic market.  In contrast, instances of 
limited international influence – the U.S. in data privacy and Europe in securities markets until 
fairly recently – have in  common relatively low degrees of regulatory capacity stemming from 
comparatively low levels of expertise, a high degree of regulatory fragmentation, and insufficient 
statutory authority.  
 
Likewise, the claim – captured by our first corollary – that regulatory capacity can overcome a 
size  disadvantage  is supp orted  by  the  evidence.   A relati ve  transatlantic  balance  now 
characterizes regulatory dynamics in international securities markets – symbolized by the new 
“EU-US Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue” launched in 2002 – despite continuing U.S. 
market dominance.  Similarly, despite the U.S.’s sizably larger market for information services, 
Europe  has been abl e  to  dominate  the  international  debate on   data  privacy  protection.    The 
evidence suggests that large markets lacking regulatory capacity may merely resist change, as in 
the  case  of t he  transatlantic  Safe  Harbor  agreement,  and  be  unable  to  shape  a  proactive 
international regulatory alternative.  Such politics of attrition contrasts sharply to market size 
predictions that anticipate conflicting great power camps. 
 





This paper highlights the limits of current work, which explains international regulatory influence 
through material aspects of domestic markets alone.  To remedy such shortcomings, we develop 
and offer an initial test for an argument that amends existing work and locates the source of 
international  regulatory  influence  in  domestic  regulatory  institutions.    These  institutions,  we 
argue,  permit  jurisdictions  with  large  markets  to  activate  their  market  size  into international 
economic clout.  Before suggesting several implications of this argument for theory and policy, it 
is important to emphasize the limits of the current study.  While the case study method employed 
is well-suited to assess the sufficiency of existing work stressing the role of market size, it cannot 
end debate on the role of domestic regulatory institutions in international economic governance.
30 
In future efforts, it would be useful to work toward quantitative measures of regulatory capacity – 
a regulatory capacity index of sorts – that wou ld enhance the approach’s utility and facilitate 
further testing.  Furthermore, even though the study leverages cases from multiple regions at 
different historical moments, its focus is on transatlantic dynamics.  It would be useful to extend 
the effort to other great powers, such as Japan and China.  For example, we anticipate that the state-
building  revolution  underway  in  China  over  the  last  decade  should  soon  significantly  alter  the 
country’s position in international economic governance, transforming it from being a mere exporter 
of commodities to one of market rules and standards as well (Suttmeier and Xiangkui, 2004). 
 
It is worth highlighting two important implications of the argument, one for theory and the other 
for business and policy.  Theoretically, our argument rests on an approach that could benefit the 
study of international political economy more generally.  Over the last ten y ears, comparative 
political economy has undergone a micro-institutional revolution.  Researchers have investigated 
how institutional configurations affect decision-making and policy outcomes.  This study has 
applied  this  approach  to  critical  issues  in  the  international  political  economy  field.   Whi le 
international political economy has long recognized the importance of international institutions for 
international outcomes, domestic institutional variables have been largely ignored.
31  Integrating the 
findings of comparative political economy more thoroughly into international political economy 
research promises important and exciting new advances and deserves thus further attention. Both 
subfields would undoubtedly benefit from enhanced exchange of ideas and insights. 
 
A case in point is the growing literature on transgovernmental networks (Slaughter, 1997; 2004; 
Raustiala, 2002).  This literature is primarily concerned with how sub-national actors such as 
regulatory  agencies  cooperate  across  borders  to  supplement  and  at  times  supplant  traditional 
means of international cooperation.  Much of this work has focused on the types of networks that 
have emerged and their roles in various thematic settings (Slaughter, 2000).  Questions about the 
origins  of these   networks,  their  varying  relevance  across  issue  areas,  and  the  distribution  of 
power  within  them  have  yet  to  be full y  explored.   Bridg ing  the  comparativist  literature  on 
bureaucratic  autonomy  with  the  work  in  International  Relations  and  International  Law  on 
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transgovernmental networks could speak powerfully to some of these questions. Dan Carpenter’s 
work, for example, provides a detailed roadmap for explaining varying degrees of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship at the domestic level (Carpenter, 2001). Applying his findings to the international 
setting would no doubt illuminate the causal processes at work in transgovernmental relations. 
 
The argument presented also has interesting implications for policymakers and firms with stakes 
in international market competition.  Its central insight is that international rules are constructed 
by  those  who  have  the  ability  to  articulate,  promote,  and  defend  their  regulations  in  the 
international  arena.   Th is  ability  depends  on  domestic  regulatory  institutions.    Against  this 
background,  the  widespread  intuition  of b usiness  lobbies  that  they  should  curtail  domestic 
regulatory authority in order to minimize regulatory burdens seems short-sighted.  The growing 
importance  of i nternational  economic  governance  even  for  domestically-focused  companies 
should flip firm preferences.  As com panies face rules settled internationally, they will have to 
fend off regulatory initiatives from foreign jurisdictions.  Business has an incentive to externalize 
its familiar domestic regulatory environment in order to minimize adjustment costs. Domestic 
regulators, which negotiate, monitor, and enforce many international market rules, then become 
the natural ally – and not enemy – of firms hoping to compete successfully in the international 
economy.  Similarly,  policymakers  and  legislators  who m ay  have op posed  delegation  of 
regulatory authority to powerful agencies in domestic settings may come to support such efforts 
as a mechanism to promote national interests in international economic debates.  In light of the 
international importance of domestic regulatory institutions, a debate over the strategic mobilization 





Aggarwal, V. K.  1985. Liberal protectionism: the international politics of organized textile 
trade. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Amable, B. 2000. Institutional complementarity and diversity of social systems of innovation and 
production. Review of International Political Economy, 7 (4): 645-87. 
Bach, D. 2004. Varieties of Cooperation: Regulating Transnational Markets for Information 
Goods. Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. 
Badaracco, J. L. J. 1985. Loading the Dice. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Bennett, C. J. 1992. Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the 
United States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Bhattacharya, U., and H. Daouk. 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading. Journal of Finance, 
57 (1): 75-108. 
Carlton,  D. W.,  and  D. R.  Fischel.  1983.  The  Regulation  of  Insider  Trading.  Stanford Law 
Review, 35: 857-95. 
Carpenter,  D.  2001.  The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy.  Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton 
University Press. 
Cerny, P. G. 1989. The 'Little Big Bang' in Paris:  Financial Market De regulation in a di rigiste 
System. European Journal of Political Research, 17 (2): 169-92. 
Cioffi, J. W. 20 02. Public Law and Private Power: The Comparative Political Economy of 
Corporate  Governance  in  the  United  States  and  Germany.  Ph.D. Di ssertation,  Political 
Science, University of California, Berkeley. 
Cohen,  B. J.  2003.  The  Geopolitics  of  Currencies  and the Fut ure  of  the  International 
System.  Paper prepared for t he  conference  "The Geopol itics  of Currencies   and  Oil",  Real 
Instituto Elcano, Madrid, Spain, 7 November. 
Council of Europe. 2004. National Laws 2003. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 
Cowhey, P., and J. Richards. 2000. Dialing for dollars: Institutional designs for the globalization 
of the market for basic telecommunications services. In Coping with Globalization, edited by 
Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart. New York: Routledge, 148-69. 
DeSombre, E. 1995. Baptists and bootleggers for the environment: The origins of United States 
unilateral sanctions. Journal of Environment & Development, 4 (1): 53-75. IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
 
  28
DeSombre,  E. 2 000.  Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, 
Environmentalists, and U.S. Power. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Drezner, D. W. 2004 . Globalization, Coercion, and Competition: the different pathways to 
policy  convergence.  Paper  prepared  for  the  Annual Mee ting  of  the Internati onal  Studies 
Association, Montreal, Canada, 17 March - 20 March. 
Evans,  P. B.,  D.  Rueschemeyer,  and T.  Skocpol.  1985.  On  the Roa d  to  a  More  Adequate 
Understanding of the State. In  Brining the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Diet rich 
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 347-66. 
Farrell, H. 2003. Constructing the International Foundations of E-commerce: The EU-US  Safe 
Harbor Arrangement. International Organization, 57 (2): 277-306. 
Fedders, J. M., F. B. Wade, M. D. Mann, and M. Beizer. 1984. Waiver by Conduct - A Possible 
Response to the Internationalization of Securities Markets. Journal of Comparative Business 
and Capital Market Law, 6 (1): 1-54. 
Flaherty,  D. H. 1 989.  Protecting privacy in surveillance societies: the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 
Fox,  E. M. 19 97.  Toward  World  Antitrust  and  Market  Access.  American Journal of 
International Law, 91 (1): 1-25. 
Fox, E. M. 2000. Competition law: linking the world. In Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: 
Legal Problems and Political Prospects, edited by George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen and 
Peter L. Lindseth. New York: Oxford University Press, 243-52. 
Franda,  M. 20 01.  Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
George, A. L. 1979. Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison.  In  Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, edited by Paul 
Gordon Lauren. New York: The Free Press, 43-68. 
Gerring, J. 2004. What Is a Cas e Study and What Is It  Good for? American Political Science 
Review, 98 (2): 341-54. 
Gilardi,  F.  2002.  Policy  credibility  and  delegation  to  independent  regulatory  agencies:  a 
comparative empirical analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 9 (6): 873-93. 
Glassman, C. 2000. Customer Benefits from Current Information Sharing by Financial Services 
Companies. Washington: The Financial Services Roundtable. IE Working Paper                                      DE8-116-I                               29 - 03 - 2005 
 
  29
Glimstedt,  H.  2001.  Competitive  Dynamics  Of  Technological  Standardization:  The Case   Of 
Third Generation Cellular Communications. Industry and Innovation, 8 (1): 49-78. 
Gruber, L. 2000. Ruling the world: power politics and the rise of supranational institutions. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Haddock, D. D., and J. Macey, R. 1986. A Coasian Model of  Insider Trading. Northwestern 
University Law Review, 80: 1449-72. 
Hall,  P. A., and D. W. Gi ngerich.  2002.  Varieties  of Capit alism  and Instit utional 
Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis. Paper prepared for the 
International Seminar on Institutional Complementarities and Dynamics of Economic Systems, 
Paris, France. 
Hall, P. A., and D. Soskice, eds. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2000. Multi-level governance and European integration. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Jabko, N. 2004. The Political Foundations of the Regulatory State. In The Politics of Regulation: 
Examining Regulatory Institutions and Instruments in the Age of Governance, edited by Jacint 
Jordana and David Levi-Faur. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
James, S. C., and D. A. Lake. 1989. The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn 
Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846. International Organization, 43 (1): 1-29. 
Kagan,  R. A. 200 1.  Adversarial legalism: the American way of law.  Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press. 
Laurence, H. 1999. Spawning the SEC. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 6 (2): 647-83. 
Longstreth, B. 1983. The SEC after fifty years: an assessment of its past and future. Columbia 
Law Review, 83: 1593. 
Lütz, S. 1998. The revival of the nation-state? Stock exchange regulation in an era of globalized 
financial markets. Journal of European Public Policy, 5 (1): 153-68. 
Mahoney,  J.  2003.  Strategies  of  Causal Assessm ent  in  Comparative  Historical  Analysis.  In 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 337-72. 
Manne, H. 1966. Insider Trading and the Stock Markets. New York: The Free Press. IE Working Paper                                       DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
 
  30
Mattli, W., and T. Büt he. 2003. Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or 
Primacy of Power? World Politics, 56 (1): 1-42. 
Milner, H. V. 1997. Interests, institutions, and information: domestic politics and international 
relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Moran, M. 1994. The State and the Financial Services Revolution: A Comparative Analysis. 
West European Politics, 17 (3): 158-77. 
Newman, A. L. forthcoming 2005. Creating Privacy: the Politics of Personal Information in 
the United States and Europe. Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Science, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
Newman, A. L., and D. Bach. 2004. Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public Power: 
Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the United States. Governance, 17 (3): 387-413. 
North, D., and B. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. Journal of Economic History, 49 
(4): 803-32. 
Oatley, T., and R. Nabors. 1998. Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, 
and the Basle Accord. International Organization, 52 (1): 35-54. 
OECD.  2002.  Measuring the Information Economy.  Paris:  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
Pierson, P. 1993. When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change. World 
Politics, 45 (4): 595-628. 
Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American 
Political Science Review, 94: 251-67. 
Pierson,  P.  2004.  Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Pollack, M. A., and G. C. Shaffer, eds. 2001. Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy. 
Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Porter, M. E. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press. 
Posner, E. 2004. Market Power without a Single Market: The New Transatlantic Relations 
in Financial Services. Paper prepared for the workshop "The New Transatlantic Agenda and the 
Future of Transatlantic Economic Governance", Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
European Union Institute, Florence, Italy, 18 - 19 June. IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                                29 - 03 - 2005 
 
  31
Putnam,  R. D. 198 8.  Diplomacy  and Dom estic  Politics:  The  Logic  of  Two-Level  Games. 
International Organization, 42 (3): 427-60. 
Raustiala, K. 2002. The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 43. 
Richards,  J.  E. 19 99.  Toward  a  Positive  Theory  of  International  Institutions:  Regulating 
International Aviation Markets. International Organization, 53 (1): 1-37. 
Schwartz, P. M., and J. R. Reidenberg. 1996. Data Privacy Law: Michie Publishing. 
Shaffer, G. C. 2002. Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New 
Approaches  to  Transatlantic  Governance  Through  Mutual  Recognition  and  Safe  Harbor 
Agreements. Columbia Journal of European Law, 9: 29. 
Simitis, S. 1995. From the Market To the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal 
Data. Iowa Law Review, 80: 445+. 
Simmons,  B. A. 199 9.  The  Internationalization  of Ca pital.  In  Continuity and change in 
contemporary capitalism, edited by Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. 
Stephens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 36-69. 
Simmons, B. A. 2001. The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market 
Regulation. International Organization, 55 (3): 589-620. 
Singer,  D. A. 20 04.  Capital  Rules:  The  Domestic  Politics  of  International  Regulatory 
Harmonization. International Organization, 58 (3): 531-66. 
Skowronek, S. 1982. Building a new American state: the expansion of national administrative 
capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Slaughter, A.-M. 1997. The Real New World Order. Foreign Affairs, 76: 183-97. 
Slaughter, A.-M. 2000. Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks. In The 
role of law in international politics: essays in international relations and international law, 
edited by Michael Byers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 177-205. 
Slaughter, A.-M. 2004. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Steinmo,  S.,  K.  Thelen,  and F. Lo ngstreth,  eds.  1992.  Structuring politics: historical 
institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Suttmeier,  R. P., a nd  Y. Xi angkui.  2004.  China's  Post-WTO  Technology  Policy:  Standards, 
Software, and the Changing Nature of Techno-Nationalism. NBR Special Report. IE Working Paper                                          DE8-116-I                               29 - 03 - 2005 
 
  32
Swire,  P.  P., a nd  R. E.  Litan.  1998.  None of your business: world data flows, electronic 
commerce, and the European privacy directive. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Thelen,  K.  1999.  Historical  Institutionalism  in Co mparative  Politics.  In  Annual Review of 
Political Science. Palo Alto: Annual Review Inc., 369-404. 
Thelen, K. 2003. How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis. In 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 208-40. 
Uncapher,  M. 2 000.  Global  e-Data:  Continental  Divide  -  Will  Europe  Lag  Behind  the  US? 
Arlington: Information Technology Association of America. 
Vogel, D. 1986. National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Britain and the United 
States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Vogel, D. 1995. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Vogel, D. 1997. Trading up and g overning across: transnational governance and environmental 
protection. Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (4): 556-71. 
Young,  A.  R.  2003.  Political  Transfer and  "Trading  Up":  Transatlantic  Trade i n  Genetically 
Modified Food and US Politics. World Politics, 55 (4): 457-84. 
Zysman, J. 1994. How institutions create historically rooted trajectories of growth. Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 3 (1): 243-83. 
 NOTAS  
D
e
p
ó
s
i
t
o
 
L
e
g
a
l
:
 
M
-
2
0
0
7
3
 
 
 
I
.
S
.
S
.
N
.
:
 
1
5
7
9
-
4
8
7
3
 
NOTAS 